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The Genius of Common Law Intellectual Property 
 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh† 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Among Richard Epstein’s influential contributions to legal scholarship over the years is his writing on common law 
intellectual property. In it, we see Epstein’s attempt to meld the innate logic of the common law’s conceptual 
structure with the realities of the modern information economy. Common law intellectual property refers to 
different judge made causes of action that create forms of exclusive rights and privileges in intangibles, interferences 
with which are then rendered enforceable through private liability. In this Essay, I examine Epstein’s writing on two 
such doctrines: “hot news misappropriation” and “cybertrespass”, which embraces several important ideas that 
modern discussions of intellectual property would do well to pay greater attention to: (1) the private law nature of 
intellectual property claims, (2) the interconnectedness of intellectual property and other basic areas of law, (3) the 
compatibility of instrumental and non-instrumental considerations, and (4) the valorization of judicial creativity in 
rule development. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Richard Epstein is an unabashed champion of the common law. Its time worn rules and 
principles, its method of incremental rule development, and its ability to adapt to changing 
circumstances are features that Epstein has routinely extolled over the course of his career. In this 
regard, his faith in the common law is closest to that of Edward Levi and Harry Kalven, Jr., the 
latter of who was well-known for believing that the common law always “work[s] itself pure.” 
(Epstein 2003, p. 73). 
 Purity, of course, is in the hands of its purveyor. Epstein belongs to a long tradition of legal 
luminaries who see in the common law not just a residual, second-best approach to law-making 
and rule development, but instead a mechanism that captures and cultivates the law’s central 
commitments to principle and reason. Sadly though, this form of thinking has been on the decline 
in the legal academy over the last several decades. Post-World War II, American legal thinking 
has been captivated by an ever-growing commitment to separation of powers and with it the belief 
that judicial law-making—the hallmark of the common law—ought to take a definitive backseat 
to legislation and executive fiat for reasons of democratic legitimacy and connected concerns.1 
 While this shift in mindset has indeed occurred in a variety of substantive areas, it is most 
pronounced in domains that are politically fraught and/or characterized by well-defined interest 
groups who see in the legislative and executive—rather than judicial—process of law-making, an 
opportunity for bargain and compromise that better serves their ends. Intellectual property law, or 
                                                     
† Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
1 For accounts of this transformation, see Purcell (1973). Much of the transformation can be attributed to the enormous 
influence of the Legal Process school of jurisprudence, developed by Hart and Sacks (1958). On the influence of Legal 
Process, see Eskridge and Frickey (1994, pp. 2045-55). 
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the law relating to the delineation and enforcement of rights and privileges in informational 
resources, remains a prominent example here. Patent, copyright and trademark law in the U.S. are 
today seen as statutory areas that Congress alone is authorized to modify. Together with the 
complex rules of federal preemption, they purport to dominate the landscape of American 
intellectual property law.  
 Yet, hidden away in the interstices of these statutory areas is a rather robust body of law 
that applies common law ideas, methods and principles to various informational resources without 
running afoul of preemption concerns. “Common law intellectual property,” as it is often referred 
to, represents a set of legal causes of action that create various rights, duties, and enforceable 
liabilities for otherwise non-rival and non-excludable assets.2 Its hallmark lies in its common law 
origins, having been developed and adapted by judges in individual cases through the deployment 
of the common law’s core concepts and principles. 
 Given his affection for all things common law, it should come as no surprise that Epstein 
has for years now been a vociferous defender of common law intellectual property, which he sees 
as adapting the core precepts of the common law for the area. My objective in this Essay is not to 
describe, critique, or respond to Epstein’s substantive defense of these doctrines, given our prior 
exchanges doing just that.3 It is instead to unbundle a few unstated but important assumptions 
about the connection between the common law and intellectual property that have formed a 
common theme in his writing on the topic, and which I argue, are worthy of serious and 
independent attention on their own.  
 To this end, my focus will be on two areas of common law intellectual property that Epstein 
has written about separately: hot news misappropriation (or the misappropriation doctrine), and 
cybertrespass. I choose these two areas not only because they represent Epstein’s most systematic 
treatment of the connection between common law and intellectual property, but also because his 
writing on the subject continues to influence debate around the doctrines. As I discuss further 
below, Epstein’s arguments in the two areas do indeed vary; yet they reveal four crucial structural 
ideas about common law intellectual property (and intellectual property more generally) that are 
insufficiently acknowledged.  
 Part I begins with a basic overview of the two common law intellectual property doctrines 
being discussed and focuses on Epstein’s writing thereon. Part II then unbundles four important 
lessons that are implicit in Epstein’s treatment of the doctrines, and extols their extension to other 
areas of intellectual property law. 
2. EPSTEIN ON COMMON LAW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
 
 “Common law intellectual property” refers to a set of mostly state law doctrines that 
employ common law ideas and principles to recognize variously tailored rights, privileges and 
                                                     
2 The earliest scholarly use of the term is by Douglas Baird (Baird 1983). For an analytical account of the area and 
its many virtues, see Balganesh (2010). 
3 Epstein and I have debated and disagreed on various aspects of common law intellectual property and intellectual 
property law more generally. See Balganesh (2009); Epstein (2010); Balganesh (2011); Epstein (2011); Balganesh 
(2012); Epstein (2012). In all fairness and despite appearances to the contrary, there is significant commonality in 
our overall approaches to the subject. 
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liabilities around different informational assets (Balganesh 2010). Almost entirely the creation of 
courts, these doctrines employ and adapt foundational ideas from the common law areas of tort, 
property, contract and unjust enrichment to new resources. Areas (or causes of action) that are 
routinely captured by this term include: trade secrets, misappropriation, idea protection, publicity 
rights, and common law copyright.  
 While each of these areas is operationally robust in itself, intellectual property thinking and 
scholarship has given little systematic thought to the functioning of these regimes and their 
structural virtues. Consequently, they continue to exist at the margins of the overall intellectual 
property system. A significant part of the criticism that is routinely leveled against common law 
intellectual property is structural, deriving from the belief that “courts are ill-equipped” to make 
the kinds of trade-offs needed to generate property-like interests in intangibles, and that regulatory 
intervention by a legislature remains a far more desirable avenue to attain the same result.4 Over 
the years, scholars and judges have continued to voice these concerns over common law 
intellectual property (see Baird 1983, pp. 415-23; Posner 2003, pp. 626-29); and while it has done 
little to dampen the working of existing regimes, it has nevertheless succeeded in attenuating the 
proliferation of new forms of common law intellectual property. 
 Of the various areas of common law intellectual property in existence today, hot news 
misappropriation and cybertrespass together offer an interesting study in contrast. 
Misappropriation was created by the Supreme Court as a matter of federal law prior to Erie, 
absorbed into state law over time, and resurrected in the last decade or so with the advent of new 
forms of information dissemination.5 While criticized by some for its overbreadth, it in many ways 
epitomizes the working of common law intellectual property and has continued to morph over 
time, in order to keep up with changing needs. Cybertrespass on the other hand was a fairly recent, 
and short-lived, common law intellectual property doctrine. Created to render certain kinds of 
internet-related behavior actionable, it eventually failed to find its footing in state common law. 
Courts eventually buried the doctrine and refused to embrace the judicial creativity needed to 
sustain its functioning. 
 Very interestingly, Epstein’s approach to both doctrines is similar—despite their divergent 
fates. It is this similarity that is worth unpacking further, since it showcases Epstein’s commitment 
to the working of the common law even in the face of a court’s unwillingness to embrace its law-
making role in the common law. 
 
 
 
2.1  Epstein on Misappropriation  
 
 The misappropriation doctrine was formulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in the celebrated 
case of International News v. Associated Press. As stipulated by the Court, the facts of the case 
                                                     
4 The quoted phrase originates in Justice Brandeis’s powerful dissent in the landmark Supreme Court case of 
International New Service v. Associated Press (248 U.S 215 [1918]).  
5 For an account of the doctrine’s life-cycle, see Balganesh (2011, pp. 422-25).  
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involved two competing news-gathering collectives: the International News Service (INS) and the 
Associated Press (AP). Members of the INS were barred from the war-font during World War I, 
as a result of which they resorted to lifting the news from the printed newspapers of the AP’s 
members. Despite efforts by the AP to prevent this through various methods, INS continued its 
practice, prompting AP to commence an action in equity seeking an injunction against INS (INS, 
248 U.S. at 229). 
 In a well-crafted opinion for the majority, Justice Mahlon Pitney sided with AP. His logic 
was fairly novel: newsgatherers had a time-sensitive “quasi-property” right against direct 
competitors that allowed them to prevent the lifting (and copying) of the news that they had 
collected for such time as the news retained commercial (i.e., newsworthy) value (INS, 248 U.S. 
at 236). As he put it: 
 
Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material out of which both parties are seeking to 
make profits at the same time and in the same field, we hardly can fail to recognize that for 
this purpose, and as between them, it must be regarded as quasi property, irrespective of 
the rights of either as against the public. 
 
It was far from apparent from the factual record that the plaintiff had endured any financial 
hardship as a result of the defendant’s copying. Accordingly, Justice Pitney framed his rationale 
for the holding in overtly moral terms, as sounding in “unfair competition” and premised on the 
logic that the defendant was reaping where it had not sown (INS, 248 U.S. at 235). 
 Justice Pitney’s opinion was unquestionably creative. With no relevant precedent to apply, 
he relied on an amalgamation of principles drawn from different areas of the common law for his 
formulation: misrepresentation, passing off, property, unjust enrichment, and indeed the law of 
trusts. The creativity of his formulation sparked a powerfully worded dissent from Justice 
Brandeis, who saw in it a usurpation of the legislative prerogative to create property rights in 
intangibles. Noting that “[c]ourts are ill-equipped” to structure exclusive rights, the dissent 
admonished the majority’s common law formulation for circumventing the established principle 
that intangibles were for the most part “free as the air to common use” (INS, 248 U.S. at 267). 
 According to Epstein, Justice Pitney got it just right. Describing him as the “most 
underrated Justice in the history of the Court,” Epstein sees in the Court’s majority opinion an 
effort to replicate the working of competitive customary norms within the news gathering industry 
(Epstein 1992, p. 92 n.20). Observing how industry norms prior to the case forbade newspapers 
from lifting each other’s reporting, while nonetheless allowing for the use of such reporting as 
“tips”, he argues that the majority opinion recognized the need to achieve a tradeoff between 
preserving the incentive needed to gather the news and the social value of its use and 
dissemination. Justice Pitney, in this reading, is seen as having approached the case in avowedly 
instrumental terms, attempting to engage in a “social utilitarian calculus” (Epstein 1992, p. 125). 
 In Epstein’s reading of the case, the Court effectively replicated industry custom through 
its regime of quasi-property, but without expressly referencing such custom. Its objectives were 
clearly utilitarian. One might have therefore decided the case by either relying on industry custom 
and converting it into binding law, or by reliance on first principles (of natural law) that achieve 
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the same. While both are in a sense permitted by the common law, he is equivocal on which of the 
two is preferable (Epstein 1992, p. 125): 
 
There is peril in both these courses of action. To use the social utilitarian calculus is a risky 
thing, and the failure to take into account certain relevant effects may lead to the adoption 
of the wrong legal rule. … As a result, the relative desirability of the two methodologies 
depends upon the comparative magnitude of their imperfections. 
 
A few things are noteworthy about Epstein’s account of the case. First, regardless of whether the 
court had adopted a custom-driven approach or a direct cost-benefit analysis, Epstein sees it as 
having formulated a two-tiered property system. In this, Justice Pitney’s reasoning is therefore 
seen as showing fidelity to standard common law concepts and ideas, albeit with important 
contextual modification. Second, Epstein underplays the obvious moral rhetoric in Justice Pitney’s 
opinions. Courts since have acknowledged the seemingly moralistic tone underlying the “reaping 
without sowing” logic of the quasi-property formulation; yet Epstein acknowledges Pitney’s use 
of the idea but instead of connecting it to desert and/or wrongdoing, treats it as a proposition about 
ex ante incentives (Epstein 1992, p. 115). Third, Epstein seemingly buries the question of 
institutional competence, which had so occupied Justice Brandeis in his dissent and which has 
since undermined Justice Pitney’s magisterial formulation in the majority opinion. I use the word 
“seemingly” quite consciously because in his exegesis, Epstein implicitly acknowledges the need 
for the Court (and indeed the lower courts) to have developed a novel, situation-specific solution 
to the free-riding that was at issue in the case. Unlike some who worry that courts might be 
confused about choosing an appropriate analogy in the creation of a novel solution (see Baird 
1983, pp. 428-29). Epstein is perfectly sanguine about letting courts work their way to the right 
solution and sees the International News case as an “enduring monument of the common law” 
(Epstein 1992, p. 115). I shall return to these points later. 
 
2.2 Epstein on Cybertrespass  
 
 The genesis of the cybertrespass doctrine is quite different from that of misappropriation, 
given its emergence as a solution to a particular technological problem. The origins of 
cybertrespass are commonly traced back to the 2000 case of eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge LLC, (100 
F. Supp. 2d 1058 [N.D. Cal., 2000]) wherein eBay, the well-known auction website sought an 
injunction against a bid aggregator, Bidder’s Edge (BE). BE had deployed electronic bots to collect 
information from various auction websites, thereby allowing consumers to avoid directly visiting 
auction websites. Aggrieved by this, eBay commenced an action alleging “trespass” by BE, among 
other claims. While recognizing the difficulties inherent in treating cyberspace as real property, 
the court nevertheless concluded that websites were more akin to land than chattels and issued an 
injunction treating the defendant’s actions as an ongoing trespass.  
 Thus emerged the cybertrespass—or electronic trespass—doctrine. Premised on the idea 
that the internet is analogous to real space, it allowed individual ownership of internet space and 
thereupon recognized a regular trespassory (i.e., trespass to land) action against unauthorized 
interferences (Epstein 2003). The problem with the doctrine was of course the absence of clear 
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reasons why movable property (chattels) was not a more appropriate analogy for the development 
of the doctrine, a choice that had an important doctrinal consequence. Whereas trespass to land 
allowed a landowner to commence an action even without a showing of harm to the land, a 
successful claim of trespass to chattels necessitated either an ongoing dispossession or proof of 
actual harm to the physical chattel itself before any relief would ensue. This position, unique to 
American common law, had emerged in the early twentieth century and was directed at ensuring 
that minor interferences did not become the subject of civil liability (Balganesh 2006). The court 
in eBay recognized this difference, but did little to convincingly make the case for modeling 
cybertrespass on one rather the other. Nevertheless, following eBay the doctrine began to develop, 
with a few courts around the country recognizing it as the basis for an independent action in 
internet cases. 
 Epstein played an important role in the eBay case, filing an amicus brief to help eBay with 
its arguments (Epstein 2003, p. 80). Shortly after the decision, he wrote a separate article making 
the case for a standalone cybertrespass doctrine, modeled more closely on real trespass law than 
trespass to chattels. In the article, Epstein this time—unlike with misappropriation—openly lauded 
the virtues of the common law method (Epstein 2003, p. 73).:  
 
The common thread in these writings is that the law takes a few steps in one direction or 
the other and then stops to reassess its progress. In so doing, the path that it takes from here 
to there may not be the most direct route available. Small incremental decisions make for 
irregular movements with lots of pitfalls. But in the long haul, sensible patterns emerge 
that can withstand both the test of history and the demands of reason. The common law 
method has hidden resources that are all too easily overlooked by scholars who start with 
some grand claim, such as the economic efficiency of the common law, only thereafter to 
force and flatten a somewhat fractious case law into this general framework.  
 
To Epstein, cybertrespass as an independent claim made perfect logical sense, and real property 
was a more preferable analogy for the action since an internet site is “fixed” in nature. The 
normative rationale for cybertrespass was, in addition, the realization of a pareto efficient 
allocation of resources for use on the internet.  
 A few years later, this theory came to be tested by the California Supreme Court in the case 
of Intel v. Hamidi (71 P. 3d 296 [Cal. 2003]). The case presented an interesting set of facts, which 
are to be appreciated against the backdrop of the technology that existed at the time. The case 
involved a disgruntled former employee of Intel, Hamidi, who began sending Intel’s employees 
innumerable emails about the company’s employment practices and conditions. In today’s 
parlance, Hamidi’s actions would constitute “spamming,” yet at the time there existed no 
technologically feasible mechanism for a recipient to filter or block these emails. Intel tried various 
method to block Hamidi’s messages, but each time Hamidi found a way around each of them. 
Frustrated by its inability to rely exclusively on self-help, Intel commenced an action for internet 
trespass against Hamidi. The matter made its way through the courts and eventually reached the 
California Supreme Court, which closely considered—and rejected—Intel’s trespass claim 
(Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 37-38). 
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 Epstein authored an amicus brief in favor of Intel, advancing the same arguments that he 
had made in his previous academic writing and suggesting that cybertrespass be modeled on 
trespass to land rather than chattels, such that it disregard any proof of harm to the asset as a 
precondition for relief. In a strongly worded opinion for the majority, Chief Justice Werdegar 
rejected Intel’s claim. Calling out Epstein’s argument, she proceeded to note how it made little 
sense to treat websites like land, when they were closer to chattel; and trespass to chattels required 
a clear showing of harm to the resource for the intrusion to be actionable. Since Intel had failed to 
demonstrate any harm to its physical servers from Hamidi’s emails, a fundamental pre-requisite of 
the action had not been satisfied. It is noteworthy that the court revealed a marked reluctance to be 
creative, in the way that Justice Pitney had been in International News. Even when presented with 
the argument that for websites, the law might be adapted to abandon its insistence on physical 
harm (since the whole idea of “physical” makes little sense on the internet), or that the action might 
be modeled on land, the court balked. Oversimplifying the argument, the majority noted (Hamidi, 
71 P.3d at 48): 
 
Since Intel does not claim Hamidi’s electronically transmitted messages physically 
damaged its servers, it could not prove a trespass to land even were we to treat the 
computers as a type of real property. Some further extension of the conceit would be 
required, under which the electronic signals Hamidi sent would be recast as tangible 
intruders, perhaps as tiny messengers rushing through the "hallways" of Intel's computers 
and bursting out of employees' computers to read them Hamidi’s missives. But such 
fictions promise more confusion than clarity in the law. 
 
In essence, the opinion failed to appreciate that in choosing chattels over land, it too was 
predicating the action on a fiction of sorts. The contrast with Justice Pitney is stark. Whereas 
Justice Pitney felt liberated from a dogmatic application of the positive law to the facts, and 
produced an alternative framework in response, Justice Werdegar’s opinion hides behind the cloak 
of positive law, refusing to acknowledge the malleability of common law principles and failing to 
fully address the normative bases for its decision. In the end, the court was indeed driven by the 
(plausible) concern that a full-blown property rights regime on the internet would do harm to 
internet communications, which it acknowledged only in passing. 
 Epstein has since been very critical of the Court’s opinion and its unwillingness to grapple 
with the logic of the core common law rules at issue (Epstein 2005). In insisting that the court 
should have relaxed/abandoned its emphasis on physical harm for the internet, he notes how that 
rule emerged in the context of “live and let live” situations of reciprocal interaction, which was 
hardly the case with Hamidi’s actions (Epstein 2005, p. 154). What is particularly noteworthy 
about Epstein’s views on the doctrine, Intel, and its evolution is his implicit belief that a judicially-
tailored solution is indeed the preferred approach. 
 
 
3. EPSTEIN’S IMPLICIT ASSUMPTIONS 
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 Woven into Epstein’s account of common law intellectual property are several important 
assumptions about the common law, judicial lawmaking, the law’s normative goals and related 
concerns. Given the elegance of his exposition, much of his argument remains persuasive even 
without these assumptions being individually defended. Nevertheless, unpacking them highlights 
additional strengths about the working of common law intellectual property that are all too often 
ignored. This Part identifies and describes four inter-related considerations lurking underneath 
Epstein’s defense of the misappropriation and cybertrespass doctrines. 
 
3.1 Common Law Intellectual Property as Private Law 
 
 Common law intellectual property highlights the role that the regime’s private law framing 
plays in the working of the system. Drawn from the common law’s need to decide the individual 
dispute at hand first before engaging in any broader social engineering, both misappropriation and 
cybertrespass rely on a framework of liability to simulate the working of property’s exclusive 
rights framework. In so doing, they focus on the horizontal relationship between the plaintiff and 
defendant, a critical component of private law thinking. The plaintiff’s rights, in other words, 
derive from the defendant’s actions/wrongdoing despite having an independent analytical 
existence. (Balganesh 2012). 
 Interspersed right through Epstein’s treatment of both misappropriation and cybertrespass 
is a core commitment to the private law foundation on which both doctrines are constructed. 
Despite arguing that the construction of each doctrine was driven by a social utilitarian impulse, 
Epstein remains willing to have that utilitarian calculus be refracted through the right-duty and 
liability framework of the common law action at issue. In other words, the horizontal, adjudicative 
framework of the area is hardly a contingent feature in his account. Instead, it frames the (property 
or “quasi-property”) right at issue in a very particular way. 
 Consider in this light, Epstein’s suggestion that Justice Pitney’s framing of the 
misappropriation doctrine would have benefited from the creation of a clear “necessity” exception, 
which might have allowed the INS to continue its actions since it had been barred from sending 
reporters to the war front (Epstein 1992, p. 105). The necessity defense has long been known as 
an exception to absolute property rights, and understood as injecting a strong relational component 
into the working of property. In situations where considerations beyond the control of a defendant 
force/require the defendant to violate the plaintiff’s property rights, it immunizes the defendant 
from liability for the infraction. Epstein appears to treat the banning of INS papers from the 
warfront by the British and French governments as amounting to an exogenous consideration that 
the court might have seen as justifying INS’s infraction, and immunize it from liability. While it 
isn’t readily apparent that such a commercial necessity is countenanced by the traditional necessity 
doctrine, originally developed for situations that imperiled life or limb, it nevertheless highlights 
Epstein’s efforts to move the common law (of necessity) forward in this precise direction. In 
previous work, Epstein has himself been deeply complimentary of the necessity doctrine in 
property law, and argued that it serves to align property law with a Pareto superior distribution of 
rights by requiring repeat players in society to “relinquish” some aspect of their rights in return for 
a long term benefit (Epstein 1990). Necessity, to Epstein, is a core attribute of property’s private 
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law foundations; one that the public law orientation of property could learn from.6 In so bringing 
a strong private law lens to bear on misappropriation, Epstein therefore sees in it the same 
foundational logic of the common law’s other private law areas—which engage in a social 
utilitarian calculus through a private law structure. 
 The same is true of Epstein’s ambitions for cybertrespass, which of course never took shape 
after the decision in Intel. Modeled on trespass to land, the conception of right that he advances in 
his writing is, in my reading, less about propertizing the internet (as some have argued7) and instead 
about identifying a private “wrong” that the defendant’s actions in a case like Intel produce. 
 This of course necessitates asking the broader question, whether Epstein’s implicit 
characterization of common law intellectual property as private law interjects additional values 
into its functioning. The most prominent of these is “corrective justice,” an idea that legal 
philosophers have long associated with private law, and which Epstein has shown some sympathy 
towards in his early work.8 This is where I suspect Epstein will disagree with my characterization, 
but in his account of both misappropriation and cybertrespass one detects similarities with his 
identification of an underlying corrective justice basis in the prima facie case of nuisance.  
 I leave for later and elsewhere, the broader question of whether Epstein’s private law 
account commits him to at least a thin version of corrective justice; but for now suffice it to say 
that the private law basis of common law intellectual property appears to be doing some work in 
his account. And this alone sets it quite apart from other instrumental accounts of common law 
(and statutory) intellectual property, which take the underlying normative structure of the 
institution as wholly contingent. 
 
3.2 The Derivative Nature of Intellectual Property 
 
 With the growing specialization of different areas of law, it should come as no surprise that 
intellectual property law is today seen as a highly technical, specialized area of study on its own. 
Indeed, such is the degree of specialization that the various sub-fields of intellectual property: 
patent, copyright and trademark are themselves seen as separate fields. This proclivity towards 
specialization has only been exacerbated by the extensive amount of legislative and regulatory 
activity that the second half of the twentieth century has seen in the field, producing a tendency 
among courts and generalist scholars/lawyers to see intellectual property law as a highly technical 
field that requires an independent domain of expertise.Common law intellectual property calls this 
trend into question. The dominant scholarly trend in the field today resists acknowledging the 
                                                     
6 As he puts it (Epstein 1990, p. 8): “I would urge that the same model of intellectual development that takes place 
within private law should provide the proper mode of analysis for the public-law systems that come to supplement or 
replace the common law.” 
7 The cybertrespass doctrine was met with significant academic criticism from its very origins, most of which was 
based on the unintended consequences of creating full-blown ownership of intangibles on the internet. See Burk 
(2000); Hunter (2003); Lemley (2003). 
8 Corrective justice theorists today draw their account of private law from Kant’s philosophy. See Weinrib (2012); 
Weinrib (1995); Ripstein (2010). While some of Epstein’s early work drew from corrective justice, it never directly 
associated the idea with Kant or his philosophy—while nevertheless adhering to conceptions of autonomy and liberty. 
See Epstein (1973); Epstein (1974); Epstein (1979); Epstein (1982).   
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derivative nature of intellectual property and its symbiotic relationship with other areas. Epstein’s 
work on common law intellectual property actively celebrates the connection between traditional 
common law and intellectual property. Perhaps more so than even those scholars who 
acknowledge the existence of the connection, Epstein views misappropriation and cybertrespass 
as premised on a finite set of rather basic rules relating to the ownership and use of assets. In his 
discussion of misappropriation, for instance, he roots Justice Pitney’s entire theory of quasi-
property in a plausible account of ownership through first possession and the expenditure of labor, 
long-known to be a stand alone justification for property. Not only does he identify the connections 
between what the majority opinion did actually formulate and the common law, but he also notes 
plausible additional such overlaps that it might have fruitfully deployed.  
 It is worth noting that this feature of Epstein’s work is hardly unique to common law 
intellectual property and has remained a recurring theme in much of his influential scholarship. 
His 1995 book Simple Rules for a Complex World focused entirely on the idea that many of 
society’s most complex legal problems might find their solutions in five or six basic principles and 
rules—all of which, unsurprisingly, can be derived from the common law (Epstein 1995). 
   
 Acknowledging and identifying a basic interconnectedness between traditional common 
law principles and intellectual property is more than just about expository elegance. To the 
contrary, it promises intellectual property thinking tangible analytical benefits. It readily guards 
against the over-complexification of intellectual property. As a subject that interacts with 
technology, intellectual property law is prone to complexification which at once both demands 
specialized knowledge from actors and impedes rapid reform in the area. Identifying the core 
foundational rules underlying the area bucks both trends. Epstein’s push for an ambitious 
cybertrespass doctrine is illustrative. Relying on ordinary trespass law, it would have allowed for 
a non-specialized solution to the problem of spam, and in the process involved generalist (state) 
court judges to build on their expertise in other domains to formulate new rules for the internet. It 
is worth noting that Epstein’s regularly argues that much of modern (statutory and federal) 
intellectual property law can also be derived from basic common law ideas. Beyond injecting a 
good degree of simplicity into intellectual property debates, this way of thinking also guards 
against strong intellectual property exceptionalism, an impulse that Epstein—albeit unwittingly—
shares with the current Supreme Court.9 
 
3.3 The Merger of Instrumental and Non-Instrumental Concerns 
 
 Epstein self-identifies in his writing as an “instrumentalist,” by which I take him to suggest 
that he believes in the connection between law and social utilitarianism (Epstein 2012). All the 
same, there is a crucial respect in which Epstein’s instrumentalism is very different from the 
standard law-and-economics literature on the common law. Whereas today’s modern 
                                                     
9 An observable trend in recent Supreme Court patent and copyright cases appears to be the belief that these areas—
technical as they may be—ought to adhere to the same set of background legal and equitable rules and principles in 
their operation. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, (547 U.S. 388 [2006]); Petrella v. MGM, Inc., (134 S. Ct. 1962 
[2014]). 
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instrumentalism exhibits an active hostility towards non-instrumental concerns and values, Epstein 
is not just sympathetic to them, but readily acknowledges a compatibility between his worldview 
and the non-instrumental one. Indeed, writing of his own work on tort law and responding to the 
criticism that his early work had once relied on “corrective justice” as an ideal, while later 
embracing instrumental thinking he noted (Epstein 2010, p. 3):  
 
Contrary to the received wisdom, I think of corrective justice as operating properly within 
the larger framework of consequentialist thought. Accordingly, I defend it (at least today) 
chiefly because of the close correspondence between allowing private rights of action to 
particular persons and the overall advancement of social welfare. We (as in the royal "We") 
allow an action for assault by the victim against the attacker, and we know that the transfer 
of wealth between these parties will have desirable incentive effects on the ex ante conduct 
of all parties. The judgment is largely categorical so that we can, for operational purposes, 
treat this as a hard edged rule. This approach has the desirable characteristic of allowing 
decisions in individual cases without forcing the lawyers and judges to recapitulate the 
arguments that show the positive alignment between private rights of action under a 
corrective justice theory and overall social welfare. 
 
This observation is worth unpacking further. We see Epstein acknowledging a basic compatibility 
between corrective justice ideals (understood in principally deontological terms) and 
consequentialist/utilitarian considerations. The two have long been seen as both incompatible and 
incommensurable, and yet Epstein suggests that his formulation enables them to co-exist.10 
Understanding how he theorizes this compatibility reveals that it emerges more from his method 
of analysis and reasoning than from any abstract solution to the incommensurability concern—
much of which extends to his discussion of common law intellectual property. 
 The key lies in his observation that the “correspondence” of the two emerges from a 
“positive alignment” between corrective justice and social welfare. By the term positive, I 
understand him to be suggesting that the correspondence is descriptive, rather than normative. This 
is an important (and obvious) concession, but one that explains a lot. As scholars have shown, 
Epstein’s work blending corrective justice with utilitarian considerations partakes of a method of 
addressing the question of incommensurability known as “conceptual sequencing”.11 It entails 
acknowledging the co-existence of instrumental and non-instrumental variables within a larger 
regime, but as either (a) operating in different parts and being allowed into the regime at different 
intervals, or (b) entailing one playing a descriptive role and the other normative, or vice-versa.  
 Epstein’s work can be seen as representing both approaches. In the above quoted 
observation, he is aligning himself with (b) and claiming that his work is descriptive of a corrective 
justice reality, which is normatively deployed towards consequential ends. Yet, in other work he 
                                                     
10 The incommensurability between efficiency-based utilitarian accounts and corrective justice driven deontological 
ones is the subject of a vast amount of academic literature. For a sample see: Chapman (2013); Chapman (2008); 
Sunstein (1993). 
11 The most well-developed account of conceptual sequencing in the legal literature is Chapman (2008). Chapman 
uses Epstein’s well-known nuisance law piece (Epstein 1979) as an exemplar of his theory. 
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employs the fundamentally defeasible structure of common law claims and doctrine to admit both 
instrumental and non-instrumental considerations into the functioning of a regime. We see the 
same approach at work in Epstein’s treatment of common law intellectual property. 
 As noted previously, Justice Pitney’s formulation of the misappropriation doctrine had 
clear moral overtones in it. His deployment of the phrase “reaping without sowing” as well as his 
focus on the wrongfulness of free-riding have caused some to claim that the opinion was motivated 
in some significant part by moral ideals. Even the Second Circuit, as recently as a few years ago, 
noted this ambiguity in the Court’s opinion but chose to sideline it through the use of copyright 
preemption principles. While Epstein’s account of the case does not deny the existence of this 
moral undercurrent in the opinion, it recasts the normative impulse of the decision in utilitarian 
terms. All the same, it recognizes that aspects of the Court’s logic—especially its reliance on first 
possession and labor as justificatory bases for property rights—originate in non-utilitarian 
considerations. To the extent then, that non-utilitarian concerns are permitted into his analysis they 
partake of the descriptive/normative conceptual sequencing described earlier. 
 In his work on cybertrespass, we see Epstein sequencing the introduction of normative 
variables through the defeasible structure of the action. The underlying ownership interest (right) 
at issue is seen to emanate from—and be premised on—owner autonomy, whether it be land or 
chattel. From that basic model though, the contours of the claim begin to reveal strong utilitarian 
ideals, ranging from the efficient allocation of resources to the creation of a workable equilibrium 
of “live and let live” among repeat actors. In Epstein’s own terms (from his analysis of nuisance 
law), the model appears to be a corrective justice driven entitlement/right that is shaped by strongly 
utilitarian constraints. 
 Epstein’s willingness to acknowledge (and at times embrace) the existence of non-
instrumental variables in his overall utilitarian calculus is an important lesson that all discussions 
of intellectual property law would do well to recognize. While utilitarian thinking is today the 
dominant approach to thinking about intellectual property, moral/deontological considerations are 
often underplayed and ignored, even within the interstices of the overall utilitarian framework out 
of fear that it will take the regime and its analysis in unfavorable directions. These accounts would 
do well to acknowledge the normative pluralism of the common law. In his account of 
cybertrespass, Epstein is thus critical of accounts that deny this reality, and in criticizing one of his 
colleagues notes that “[t]he common law method has hidden resources that are all too easily 
overlooked by scholars who start with some grand claim, such as the economic efficiency of the 
common law, only thereafter to force and flatten a somewhat fractious case law into this general 
framework” (Epstein 2003, p. 73). 
 
3.4 Judicial Lawmaking 
 
 Endorsing the “common law method” involves acknowledging the well-known reality that 
the common law is judge-made law, and that judges occupy a central place in developing and 
adapting legal rules in an incremental manner over time—with or without guidance from the 
legislature. As noted previously, much of the modern discomfort with the common law originates 
in the belief that unelected judges lack the democratic legitimacy needed to engage in lawmaking, 
and that the ex post nature of their enterprise imbues the legal system with a degree of uncertainty 
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and unpredictability that is worthy of being avoided. To a large extent, this discomfort tracks the 
private law/public law divide, in so far as the common law is fundamentally composed of private 
law areas, while divided lawmaking and legislative activity is commonly treated as the subject of 
public law. 
 In recognizing the strengths of common law intellectual property, and at times its 
superiority over statutory intellectual property, Epstein must be seen as embracing the judicial role 
in intellectual property formulation. Indeed, Justice Brandeis’s entire diatribe against the 
majority’s opinion in International News was about institutional competence, and the perils of 
having courts engage in a social welfare analysis. Epstein notes the hypocrisy of the Brandeis 
dissent, given that Brandeis had prior to the case co-authored an important article on privacy law, 
which extoled the common law development of the area by courts.12 
 Judicial lawmaking has its obvious strengths—especially for intellectual property—a 
reality that Epstein’s work on common law intellectual property readily reveals. First, it allows 
the law to proceed nimbly, given the unpredictable nature and speed of socio-technological change. 
The misappropriation doctrine is a good example. The developments that spawned the action came 
about rather suddenly, and Congress—after a period of consideration—had decided not to pass a 
statute creating property rights in news. For Congress to have considered an intermediate (i.e., 
unfair competition) option would have taken years given the sheer novelty of such an option, which 
would have produced a protracted debate;13 in contrast to the speed with which Justice Pitney’s 
formulation went to work. Second, it allows for experimentation and change. Lawmaking in an 
area of rapid socio-technological change involves the recurring obsolescence of well-crafted rules 
and principles. Some rules will be unquestionably wrong and require rolling back, while others 
will require modification and updating over time. Judicial lawmaking offers intellectual property 
law an opportunity to experiment with different rules over time, learn from any mistakes, and 
eventually settle on a rule that works the best—in contrast with one-size-for-all legislative 
interventions that require complex workarounds. Epstein’s ambitious cybertrespass model may or 
may not have worked to control all forms of unlawful interferences on the internet that we see 
today. Nevertheless, as we wait for the perfect legislative/regulatory response to a wider category, 
the system runs the risk of letting a variety of unclassified harms go without redress, letting the 
perfect become the enemy of the good. Third, and related to something before, judicial lawmaking 
allows judges—as generalists—to carry over important insights about the judicial process and 
legal system more generally, into intellectual property. To a degree (and here I am not sure Epstein 
                                                     
12 As Epstein (1992, p. 116) observes: “The great irony is that Brandeis, whose seminal article on privacy celebrated 
the capacity of the common law to grow in response to new issues, was willing to dump the issue of the creation of 
property rights in news back into the lap of Congress, which had failed to pass such a statute a few years before INS 
was decided.” In prior work, Brandeis and a co-author had authored an influential article on privacy that extoled the 
common law method of rule development for the area. See Warren and Brandeis (1890). 
13 Legislative reform of intellectual property has historically taken an extended period of time. The most recent 
overhaul to the Patent Act—the America Invents Act of 2011—was the result of nearly six years of debate in Congress. 
(Matal 2011). The last major reform of the Copyright Act, which resulted in the Copyright Act of 1976 took a whole 
21 years to succeed (Litman 1987). Contrast this with the speed with which the International News case concluded: 
the original district court opinion was decided on March 29, 1917, the Second Circuit decided the first appeal on June 
21, 1917, while Justice Pitney handed down his opinion for the Supreme Court on December 23, 1918. From start to 
finish—through three rounds—the case took well under two years.  
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will agree with me), it involves a good amount of faith in judicial craftsmanship and wisdom, as 
well as a belief in the ability of courts to address complex issues using the right set of tools and 
analogies. Some of the criticism of common law intellectual property has emanated from a concern 
with the ability of courts to choose appropriate common law analogies to use in their construction 
of doctrine, (see Baird 1983), I think Epstein would see this criticism as off-mark, given the 
ubiquity of analogical rule development in the common law; a task that courts have been required 
to develop and deploy for centuries now. 
 The emphasis on judicial lawmaking is of course strongest for common law intellectual 
property. Yet as a model, it carries over in significant degree to other forms of (statutory) 
intellectual property as well. There, the concern is about coordinating the roles of courts and 
legislators as lawmakers, and while courts should (and do) take a secondary position in the overall 
lawmaking equation, the same strengths of the common law process and method ought to be seen 
as worthy of application to what is a putatively interpretive exercise. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
 As a creative polymath, few areas of the law have escaped Richard Epstein’s scrutiny. 
While each area has of course required its own set of nuanced arguments, Epstein’s interventions 
have been routinely characterized by an emphasis on simplicity and coherence, values that may be 
traced back to the fundamentals of the common law, rooted as it is Roman law ideas and concepts. 
Intellectual property scholarship and jurisprudence have unfortunately proceeded in just the 
opposite direction over the last few decades, under the garb of technological complexity and the 
need for heightened expertise. Epstein’s writing on common law intellectual property highlights 
the virtues of bucking this trend and recognizing the value in looking to the old when in the pursuit 
of the new. Legal scholarship and thinking would benefit from more Epsteinian thinking of this 
kind, grounded as it is in the fundamental “genius” that is the analytical structure of the common 
law.14 
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